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Abstract (E): 
This is a documentation of the agent-based-simulation environment “masFIRA” that has been developed to 
demonstrate implications of game theoretical models of the partner matching process, bargaining approaches 
on intrafamily resource allocation, and fertility behaviour. As development still proceeds, this  documentation is 
rather a status report on models and modules implemented by December 2004.  
 
 
 
Abstract (D): 
Dies ist die Dokumentation der agenten-basierten Simulationsplattform „masFIRA“, die entwickelt wurde, um 
Implikationen von spieltheoretischen Modellen betreffend Partnersuchprozesse, intra-familiärer 
Ressourcenallokation und Fertilitätsverhaltens zu demonstrieren. Die Plattform ist nach wie vor in 
Weiterentwicklung, deshalb ist diese Dokumentation auch als Status Report der bis Ende 2004 
implementierten Module zu betrachten.  
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1 Introduction 
Structural family dynamics – partners’ matching processes, stability of families, occurrence of divorces, 
and fertility –  are handled quite differently within social sciences. While sociologists and psychologists 
primarily tend to investigate these topics with depth-grounded methods, economic theory and empirical 
approaches rely on comparably straightforward models of  rational behaviour. Individuals (“agents”) differ 
by endowments – talents, human capital stocks, property, integration in social networks, … –  and by 
their preferences. Most approaches abstract from these differences as economic models of household 
behaviour discuss the issues subjected by parameteriseable utility functions subject to endowment 
constraints held as general as possible. Therefore, economic models can come to unambiguous results of 
the optimisation problem of a prototype agent, but agents’ behavioural heterogeneity is systematically 
neglected.  
 
To meet observed or even potential heterogeneity, several techniques have been developed. One group 
of these techniques are agent based simulations in social sciences. Each agent can – and has to – adjust 
his behaviour to his individual environment and experience. Therefore, the agents’ endowments and 
social environments but also the objectives change over time. The development of individual values and 
social norms will be embedded in a process of bounded rational behaviour of agents with limited 
knowledge, limited memory, and reduced rational expectations. But these values and norms are – 
together with emotions – the most important substitutes for “deficiency” in pure rationality. This logical 
circle can hardly be modelled with conventional economic models. Approaches of bounded rationality– 
from the seminal work of Herbert Simon (1966) to current developments – seem more appropriate. 
Another seminal work – Axelrod’s work (1992) on cooperative behaviour and his extensions of 
cooperative game theory seem also promising for reducing the deficiencies of the homo oeconomicus-
approach in respect to observed social behaviour. Last, not least recent developments in behavioural 
economics support these approaches, see e.g. Kahneman/Tversky (ed. 2000) for a comprehensive 
depiction of this economic school of thought.  
 
Applications of agent based simulation to social sciences in general and family-related issues in concrete 
have been broadly published over the last years. Billari/Fuernkranz-Prskawez (ed. 2003) have collected 
valuable contributions of agent-based models to demographic sciences, Ballot/Weisbuch (ed. 2000) 
edited contributions of ABS-applications in the field of sociology, geography, urban planning, politics and 
history, and strategic market behaviour, just to name two of these publications. Permanent updates of 
the latest publications can be found in the electronic “Journal of Artifical Societies and Social Simulation” 
(JASSS)1, latest developments in agent based computational economics (ACE) at ACE-website2. 
 
This is the documentation of a demo-version of an agent-based simulation environment, where well 
developed miroeconomic models of family dynamics and fertility behaviour, intra-household decisions 
and resource allocations, human capital investment, time allocation and labour supply are condensed to a 
– still compact – dynamic model. In section 2 the underlying economic models will be presented, 
followed by a general description of ABS programs (section 3). 1concept of masFIRA will presented in 
section 5, followed by the description of some simulation runs in chapter 6. The paper concludes in an 
outlook (7). The program code is appended after the literature index. 
                                                
1 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/JASSS.html 
2 http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htm 
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2 At a glance – the Family from economists’ view 
 
As intra-family decisions are the most original topic of economics3, libraries have been written on that 
topic. Recently – say within the last two decades – the scope has been shifted from household studies to 
the analysis of firms and markets. In the 60ies the internal processes of the household sector were 
rediscovered for economic analysis. Since then, the household was not just consumer and supplier of 
labour force, the intra-household production process became evident to economists. More than that, 
the theoretical work on this issue first gave some (possible) insight to the “black box“ of intra-household 
decisions.4  
2.1 Economic reasons for marriage – and divorce 
The first “black box” in economic thought was the question: “Why do (fully) rational individuals share a 
household, why do they marry?”. Of course a set of answers regarding economic motives can be given 
ad hoc:   
o Cost sharing for intra-household public (non-rival) goods, 
o risk pooling among family members, 
o division of labour to exploit comparative advantages and increasing returns of scale, 
o extending possible credit volumes within imperfect credit markets and coordination of 
investment activities, and, most important, 
o to raise children, as most individuals obviously have some preference for having children . 
 
As these points show up (in different extent everlasting) benefits from marriage, they have traded off to 
some costs. Interestingly, this point has been emphasized rarely in the literature. Divorce occurs, when 
the benefits cited begin to fall under the costs of partnership.  
2.2 The matching process 
Having stated economic reasons for marrying, the question “Who marries – rationally – whom?” 
becomes evident. Therefore some seminal game theoretical models were developed, rationalizing the 
empirical fact of “perfect matching”. Following these approaches individuals strongly prefer a partner with 
– at least – comparable social status like themselves. As both potential partners think that way, the only 
solution to this optimisation problem is a – society-wide – perfect partner matching. The only possibility 
for mating of members of different social classes arises, when genders are distributed differently over 
classes. 
 
Of course also less restrictive approaches have established. Nevertheless, determinant of mate matching 
are also a central issue within respective simulation approaches. 
                                                
3 oikos  (gr.) the household Î science of all facilities relevant to the private household; with the development of 
markets and the increasing specialisation of the labour force and the separation of workplace and place of 
residence, economics began to lift off sociology and started to become a science for its own.  
4 As economic modelling relies on rationality assumptions, the discussion within this chapter is reflected following 
this paradigma. As antithesis, as we will see later, agents based modelling and artificial intelligence approaches are 
following the paradigma of “bounded rationality”.   
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2.3 Intra-family decisions on resource allocation 
This is the issue at the hart of economic analysis. Some approaches have emphasized this issue as the 
central question. The other issues – mating, having children, and separating again – are just a form, 
respectively a consequence of resource allocation. Every resource allocated has to be considered in 
these models. Wealth, goods and services, labour, all items the utility functions respectively the budget 
constraints consist of. Finally, “time” can be seen as fundamental category all these items dissolve in5.  
2.3.6 Unitarian approach 
Within this approach6 decisions a settled jointly with no disagreement. Models are designed with a 
unitary utility function that contains all needs of all household members. Thinking on  a “benevolent 
dictator” this model can be  applied  to households  organized in strict hierarchy. The head of the 
household decides in favour of all. Agents do not have an individual utility function, they all contribute to 
the common objective function instead. 
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The family’s utility is  gained my  maximizing the – common – utility function. This function consist of 
private goods  (vector  kx ; k is an index for household members), intra-household public goods ( X ) 
and the individual agents’ process benefits from vector of activities ( kt ), subject to total amount of time 
and wealth.  
2.3.7 Collective approach 
Contrary to this model alternatives have been developed. Within the so called collective models7 or 
bargaining approach, partners negotiate over the resource allocation (time and goods). Therefore a 
Nash-bargaining model is used  for analysis:  
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Within this approach both  partners try to maximize their own, individual utility, but mind  the  other’s 
situation in some  respect: When the utility function of either partner falls below her/his reservation 
level, this partner could – and within this cooperative game approach, would immediately –  leave the 
                                                
5 This fundamental insight can be followed up by quotations like “Ökonomie der Zeit, darin löst sich schließlich alle 
Ökonomie auf” (“Economy of time, to this all economy ultimately reduces itself”) (Karl Marx, 1857) or “Different 
constraints are decisive for different situations, but the most fundamental constraint is limited time” (Gary S. Becker, 
1993) 
6 see Becker (1993) and Willis  (1973) for details 
7 see Ott (1992), Bourguignon/Chiappori (1992),  
  masFIRA 
 
 8
partnership, as  her/his outside options (the reservation level  Di) are beyond  the utility level obtained  
within the partnership.  Within this approach, agents are “restricted” to Pareto-efficient resource 
allocations and partnership constellations.  
 
Within this simulation environment the underlying general assumption of fully rational behaviour is 
relaxed in some respect, nevertheless the (partly competing) models of this simulation are near to the 
idea of collectively rational egoistic agents, Chiappori (1988) developed.  
 
3 What is Agent-Based-Simulation?  
 
Agent based simulation (ABS) models have been developed quite far today. To describe the properties 
and power of ABS in the field of social science simulation, it is advisable to begin with its predecessor, 
the so called cellular automata (CA). A CA consists of a number of cells arranged in a regular grid. Every 
“agent” is a cell that is situated within other cells in a multidimensional array. In a two-dimensional setting 
this cell is located on a (seemingly) rectangular grid. In most CA models the border-cells are connected, 
so that a cell on the left “border” is connected to the cell on the “right bordered” cell in corresponding 
height of the grid. Analogously a cell on “top” of the grid is the neighbour of the corresponding cell on 
the “bottom”. So each cell has the same number of neighbouring cells and the seemingly rectangular grid 
represents the surface of a torus. In social simulations cells may represent individuals or collective actors 
like households, firms, communities or even countries. Each cell can be in one of a few states, for 
example, `on' or `off', or `alive' or `dead', represent attitudes (e.g. supporting one of several political 
parties), individual characteristics (e.g. ethnical origin), or actions (e.g. co-operating or not co-operating 
with others). Time advances through the simulation in discrete steps. After each time step, the state of 
each cell may change. The state of a cell at any time step is determined by a set of rules which specify 
how that state depends on the previous state of that cell and the states of the cell's immediate 
neighbours. The same rules are used to update the state of every cell in the grid. The model is therefore 
homogeneous with respect to the rules. Because the rules only make reference to the states of other 
cells in a cell's neighbourhood, cellular automata are best used to model situations where the 
interactions are local. CAs have been used as models in many areas of mathematics, biology and physical 
science, as well as social science.  
 
In contrast to CA simulation ABS models8 are somewhat more complex in their internal processing and 
consequently in their behaviour. Such automata are conventionally called ‘agents’. While there is no 
generally agreed definition of what an `agent' is, the term is usually applied to describe self-contained 
programs, which can control their own actions based on their perceptions of their operating 
environment. Agent based programming is rapidly becoming important outside the field of social 
simulation. For example, agents have been built to watch out for interesting information as it becomes 
available over the Internet, informing the user if it finds relevant sources. The agent is instructed about 
the topics thought to be interesting and it then continuously monitors known sources for items fitting 
this profile. Other agents have been built to guide people to use software more effectively (like the 
annoying wizard agents within Microsoft Office package). 
 
                                                
8 or synonymously: multi agent systems (MAS) 
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Typically an ABS-model consists of the grid, similar to a CA environment, and agents inhabiting this grid. 
In general cells cannot move while agents can. The cells or patches are endowed with certain properties 
– like colour or height – that also can influence the neighbouring cells’ characteristics. These properties 
can be – and in most cases actually are – ‘inherited’ by the actual patch in the next period. Agents 
situated on or moving towards a cell communicate with that particular cell: following a set of predefined 
rules the agent’s properties and the cell’s characteristics have to match. Unless such a feasible 
combination accomplishes, the agent has to move onwards (given it can regarding the rules for mobility), 
or the patch has to adjust its properties (assimilate to the agent’s needs following the appropriate rules), 
or the agent has to alter its characteristics (assimilate to the cell’s endowments following the relevant 
rules). The agent also simply can die, technically spoken it simply changes its status from ‘alive’ to ‘dead’ 
and vanishes from the population in the next period.  
 
Following Wooldridge and Jennings (1995) agents have typically the following properties9: 
 autonomy: agents operate without others having direct control of their actions and internal 
state;  
 social ability: agents interact with other agents through some kind of `language' (a computer 
language, rather than natural language);  
 reactivity: agents are able to perceive their environment (which may be the physical world, a 
virtual world of electronic networks, or a simulated world including other agents) and respond 
to it;  
 pro-activity: as well as reacting to their environment, agents are also able to take the initiative, 
engaging in goal-directed behaviour. 
 
In addition, agents often seem to have some degree of intentionality. That is, their behaviour is 
interpreted in terms of a metaphorical vocabulary of belief, desires, motives, and even emotions, 
concepts which are more usually applied to people rather than to computer programs. For the 
programmer’s purposes, it is only necessary to view the ascription of intentionality as a matter of 
modelling: a computer agent does not have intentionality, but is constructed to simulate some (much 
simplified) aspects of human intentions. These general properties generate a set of (more concrete) 
attributes agents are endowed with: 
 
Knowledge and beliefs: Agents will need to base their actions on what they think to know about their 
environment – the regions of the grid, the characteristics of particular patches within the region and the 
agents ‘around’. Some of the information they have may be incorrect, as a result of faulty perception, 
faulty inference, or incomplete knowledge. This possibly erroneous information – the agent’s beliefs – is 
distinguished from its true knowledge. From an observer’s point of view this distinction can be evaluated, 
the agent of course can not figure out.   
 
Inference: Given a set of beliefs, agents may be able to infer further information from it. For example, 
believing that agent B has recently ‘eaten' some ‘food', agent A could infer that the place to find food is 
near where agent B was located. Of course, this inference may be wrong (perhaps agent B consumed all 
the food). 
                                                
9 cited from: Gilbert/Troitzsch (1999) 
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3.1 Social models  
Some agents may be capable of learning about the interrelationships between other agents in their 
world, for example, that agent A has recently interacted with agent B. On the basis of such snippets of 
data, an agent may be able to put together a picture of the social relationships in their environment, that 
is a `social model'. Agents may also have models of other aspects of their world, for example, they may 
develop a model of the `geography' of their environment. Note that these agents' models are quite 
different from the simulation model which the researcher builds; agent models are built by the agents 
themselves while the simulation runs. 
3.2 Goals  
Since agents are built to be autonomous and purposive, if they are to engage in action they need to be 
driven by a need to satisfy some internal goal such as survival. Surviving may in turn require the 
satisfaction of subsidiary goals, such as acquiring energy and avoiding lethal dangers.  
3.3 Knowledge representation  
In order to construct its models, an agent needs some way to represent its beliefs. Techniques for doing 
this have been studied by researchers on artificial intelligence. One generally useful approach is to use 
predicate logic to store declarative statements, such as “There is food at location X'', and formulae such 
as “If an agent is eating at location X, there is food at location X'', where X is a variable to be filled in 
depending on what the agent ‘sees' around it.  
3.4 Planning  
An agent needs to have some way of determining what behaviour is likely to lead to the satisfaction of 
its goals, so the agent needs to plan its activities. Planning involves working backwards from a desired 
goal state, inferring what action would lead to that goal, what state would be required before that action 
can be carried out, what action is needed to arrive at that state, and so on, until one gets back to the 
current situation of the agent.  
3.5 Language  
All multi-agent models include some form of interaction between agents, or at a minimum, between 
individual agents and the environment in which they exist. The interaction might involve the passing of 
information from one agent to another, the (bilateral) negotiation of contracts – like in the masFIRA  
case, or unilateral signalling to evoke certain behaviour of the other agents around.  
3.6 Modelling the environment  
 
In all multi-agent simulations, the agents are located in an environment. What constitutes an environment 
depends on what is being modelled, but if the agents are individual people, rather than organisations, 
one of the main functions of the environment will be to provide a spatial context. Each agent will be 
located in a simulated space, in much the same way as actors are located within a cellular automata grid. 
In many such models, the agents will be able to move around the environment. Although such a spatial 
world is the most common environment, others are possible. For instance, the agents may move 
through a network of nodes and links (this might be useful if, for instance, the simulation was concerned 
with financial markets or state development issues, with the network modelling trading links).  
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Once agents are positioned within an environment, they will need ‘sensors' to perceive their local 
neighbourhood and some means with which to affect the environment. Usually, communication 
between agents is routed through the environment, which forwards messages on to the appropriate 
recipient. In this case, agents will also need to be able to ‘hear' messages coming from the environment 
and to send messages to the environment for onward transmission.  
 
The designer will also need to decide about the order in which the agents in the simulation are given 
computing time. Ideally, all agents ought to operate in parallel. However, since most simulations run on 
sequential, rather than parallel computers, the desired parallel operation must itself be simulated, usually 
by running the program code for each agent within one loop, when all agents have done their activities 
for that round, the first will stand the next round of actions. Unfortunately, the order in which agents are 
run can have a major effect on the course of the simulation unless suitable precautions are taken. For 
example, if agent A sends a message to agent B, but B is run before A, agent B will not get the message 
from A until the next round, by which time the message may be no longer relevant.  
3.7 Is it science?  
Indeed, while agent based simulation has become a valuable and venerated “tool” within other 
disciplines – in biology or demography it has become quite important already – social sciences and 
especially economics have had viewed ABS quite sceptically. Empirical instruments have been developed 
quite far in econometrics, computer experiments are still generally associated with changing values of an 
exogenous variable and – ceteris paribus – watching and analyzing the shifts in endogenous variable(s) 
within a system of econometric equations. Even system dynamics simulations10 have had a hard standing 
within economic sciences. Anyway, some economists have already specialized in ABS and founded a new 
research area, the so called agent-based computational economics (ACE). Despite of the still 
widespreaded scepticism, ABS – or ACE – are expected to become one of the most vital new 
methodological fields in economic and demographic analysis in the next years.  
 
                                                
10 system dynamics simulation procedures  are systems of structured differential equations. Most prominent is the 
SD-simulation „World-3“ written by Jay Forrester in the simulation environment “DYNAMO”. Later these 
simulations were adopted by Dennis Meadows (within the improved simulation package “STELLA”), whose book 
(Meadows ea. 1972) – where he and his research team described the ecological and economical simulated 
developments of the earth – became very famous in the 70-80ies.  
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4 NetLogo – a programming environment for ABS 
 
The simulation platform masFIRA is developed in NetLogo, a programming language especially designed 
for agent based  programming11. NetLogo is a successor of the well known programming language 
LOGO, which had been frequently used from the 80ies, primarily in fields of education. The semantic of 
LOGO was, and the semantic of NetLogo still is quite near to spoken English, so the code is not too 
compact, but can be understood quite instantly, even by a reader, who has no experience within this 
programming language.  
 
Operating system: NetLogo itself is programmed in Java, so it can be developed and run on different 
operating systems. masFIRA, for instance, has been primarily developed on a Windows 2000 resp. 
Windows XP computer, but some modules were designed and improved within LINUX operating 
system (SuSE 9.0, with latest Linux – (alpa)Kernel). For Windows platforms, the compiler comes as an 
executable file, so additional software is needed. Within LINUX, the (latest) Java-RE is needed to start 
the programming environment and run the applications. In general, NetLogo is designed as stand alone 
application. 
 
Web-based applications: Individual models can be run as Java applets inside a web browser. Like the 
stand alone applications, a simulation run within a web browser takes all computational resources 
available (within Windows systems), so other programs run simultaneously will slow down considerably. 
 
Turtles’, patches’, and globals’ monitors: The status, personal endowments, and characteristics of each 
agent (so called “turtles” in NetLogo) can  be viewed separately (and even  simultaneously) at any  stage 
of simulation via the so called “turtles  monitor”. A similar monitor exists for all cells of the grid 
(“patches” in NetLogo). Global variables of course have one  unique monitor that displays the values of 
all global variables. 
 
Behaviour space: A valuable element of NetLogo is the so called “behaviour space”,  where simulations 
at different parameter values can be  run  automatically. The researcher gets the results in structured  
tables and graphs. With this feature NetLogo has become  a convincing tool for scientific  research. 
Without this feature, to run comparable simulations (program driven), sophisticated meta-object would 
have to be defined with each project.  
 
Hub Net control: For interactive classroom demonstrations or experimental simulations with interaction 
to a couple of “real” agents – humans that participate  in scientific experiments – it is possible to 
program  a so called “Hub Net”. Stimuli and responses of the real agents are sent from their 
workstations or notepads to the hub-net server, are processed there and the reactions of the virtual 
agents come back to the humans, and so on. This is the only feature, masFIRA does not make use off 
yet.   
 
License for NetLogo: The NetLogo software, models and documentation are distributed free of charge 
for education and research12.  
                                                
11 See Wilensky (1999) 
12 COPYRIGHT  STATEMENT for NetLogo:   
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4.1 A NetLogo-example of agent based simulations in social sciences. 
To give some insight how ABS  works, a small program is described13. Agents are constantly situated on 
their cells. They show up different grades of altruism. Agents with high grade or altruism prefer to make 
their  living in cooperation with  their neighbours – given that these neighbours also show a  high grade 
of altruism – at some costs and at some (expected and realized) benefit from cooperation. Given an 
agent just has selfish neighbours, altruism  does not pay  any longer, so this agent will probably reduce his 
willingness to cooperate. A full description as well a depiction of a simulation run is in the Appendix 
(page 25ff). 
 
Simulation starts with randomly distributed values for the degree of altruism. About the half of the 
population is attributed either to altruists or selfish agents. The other 50% of the population does not 
belong to either group yet (Figure 6).  
 
First, the indifferent agents decide whether to have a high of low propensity to cooperate. In this short 
phase the share of altruists as well as the population of selfish agents rises. This takes about 10 periods in 
the simulation. Then, within the next 100 periods, the “breed” of altruists diminished, but after control 
action (1)14 by the user this movement decelerated. Nevertheless, population of altruists still decreased. 
After control action (2)15 altruists’ population share started to rise, while the population of the selfish 
agents diminished (Figure 7). 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
“Copyright 1999 by Uri Wilensky. All rights reserved. 
 
The NetLogo software, models and documentation are distributed free of charge for use by the public to explore 
and construct models. Permission to copy or modify the NetLogo software, models and documentation for 
educational and research purposes only and without fee is hereby granted, provided that this copyright notice and 
the original author's name appears on all copies and supporting documentation. For any other uses of this software, 
in original or modified form, including but not limited to distribution in whole or in part, specific prior permission 
must be obtained from Uri Wilensky. The software, models and documentation shall not be used, rewritten, or 
adapted as the basis of a commercial software or hardware product without first obtaining appropriate licenses 
from Uri Wilensky. We make no representations about the suitability of this software for any purpose. It is 
provided "as is" without express or implied warranty.” 
13 This  is  a simulation of Wilensky (1998) 
14 increasing (global) “harshness of living conditions” parameter (from value 0.00 Î to value 0.73) 
15 increasing “benefits of altruism” (0.48 Î0.75) 
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5 The concept of masFIRA 
5.1 General remarks 
Generally, the masFIRA simulation platform is designed as open as possible. As the project will not be 
accomplished within one continuous study, rather a couple of additional modules will be programmed 
and implemented with each step. At the end of each step the simulation platform has to work with the 
elder procedures alone as well as together with the new modules. For example: with the first step the 
environment and the agents-matching procedure was developed. The following step – the bargaining 
procedures over the critical event “giving birth to another child” – has to be programmed that way it can 
be switched off easily. That way there is a guaranty that procedures can easily be replaced after a while 
or – more interesting – alternative procedures and competing models of human behaviour can be tested 
and compared sequentially (changing the behavioural model for all agents) or simultaneously (e.g. 
changing the behavioural model for half of the “male” agents by assigning every male agent with an even-
numbered ID an alternative model).  
 
Milestones in the development of masFIRA are:  
• design of the fundamental environment (see 5.2) 
• design of (new) output   
• implementation of (competing) models of human behaviour at the core (see 5.3) 
• stratification and alignment procedures Î link to demographic and econometric research 
 
Note that these milestones are not in sequential order. Every module can have elements of all four 
milestones. Example: The fundamental environment changes with addition of the agents’ characteristics 
that in turn have to be extended with implementation of additional behavioural elements. So, for 
instance, when agents just mate according to the value of a scalar concerning “attractiveness”, agents just 
have to be endowed with this item. When – designed and implemented in another module – agents 
select their partners according to a group of values (say, education, age span, inclusion in certain social 
class, region, religion, and wealth) all values of the concerning vector have to be compared. In addition, 
agents have their individual valuing and weighting function for these characteristics, so the parameters of 
the valuing and weighting function also have to be implemented.  
5.2 Environment and the fundamental procedures 
In contrast to the compact altruism model discussed in 4.1, the idea of masFIRA is much wider. As the 
model is designed open to additional models, the environment (agents’ and cells’ characteristics, 
interaction rules) have to be defined flexible to meet future changes  and extensions. Within this 
simulation environment, agents act actively while cells are entirely passive. The just change properties 
when the agents situated on them have called for this change. 
 
First, behavioural rules for of agents, and the properties of cells and globals will be listed. After that, the 
most important underlying behavioural models – the core of this ABS – will be described. 
5.2.1 The agents  
Agents are embedded in their family network. Each agent therefore knows his parents and his children. 
Further information on family networks can be queried by each agent from the  relatives s/he knows  
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(e.g. to have a list of first grade nephews and nieces the agent first asks his/her mother for the ID of 
his/her siblings, then s/he queries the IDs of the children of these agents). In fact agents forget about their 
former partners, but – given they have common children – they can ask them who this partner was. 
 
The search process for partners – it’s rules, and the communication tasks  within – is quite 
straightforward: Agents are separated in gender classes and have a certain age. Females are located 
persistently on their grid16. When having become adult17, males start to search partners. Males are 
moving around the grid, with differing speed dependent on their propensity to find a partner. Depending 
on the speed, density of the population18, and the age-specific gender distribution the male will come – 
sooner or later – to a cell inhabited by a female. Now two scenarios can arise: Either the male’s age lies 
within the accepted partner’s age span19 of this female, then he can stay for a moment, or  not – he will 
be thrown out. Typically the male moves on one cell in either direction, but, when after a number of 
trials he does not come to a female-empty cell, he has to jump farer  distances20. In case that the male’s 
age is convenient, the male now considers the age of the female. Given this match in successful, the 
potential partners have a closer look on the other, described in 5.3.1 
 
Agents are also equipped with negotiation power – simply a scalar with limits [0,1] – that supports them 
in intra-family bargaining situations. This scalar is fixed yet, but will become a fuzzy function21 of past 
experience and human capital. Past experience will be individually weighted by actuality. 
 
Agents are equipped with a scalar that values the satisfaction within current partnership [0,1], where 
single agents have [0]. (The case of “formerly experienced spouses, now convinced singles” is also  
recognized, but not depicted in this parameter). 
 
Agents differ in their propensity of having children – their fecundity. Males’ fecundity lies in the interval of 
[0,3.5] while females’ fecundity can come up to 4 children. Note that fecundity is real, not integer! For 
every full interger a child is wanted for sure, for the rest, the decimal values remaining a more or less 
strong position is taken in the bargaining process whether to have another child or not. 
 
The agents also “remember” certain dates, like the own day of birth or the day of mating the current 
partner – gender makes no difference in this respect22. Further agents are endowed with certain stocks 
of human capital that depreciates over time. Agents have to decide whether to reinvest at some costs 
(both, in terms of money and time). Agents receive income –  wages, capital income, and transfers23. 
They assign their time to market labour, home production, child care, leisure and educational activities. 
Agents own private goods, that are purchased on markets at globally known prices. Families own – in 
                                                
16 In fact females only move once their life – when having become adult and leaving the parent’s home (cell) 
17 all agents become adult at age 20, but this can easily be heterogenized 
18 number of (adult) agents per number of cells on the grid 
19 Males and females generally have different age spans they accept for their partners. The age spans can be  fixed 
or be a function of the quantity of potential partners globally “offered” within a year. As described below, the time 
span also differs individually. 
20 Still, it is possible that one male meets the same female more than once, but more unlikely the shorter the time 
interval. 
21 the fuzziness will be controlled globally 
22 but of course – in order to meet reality – this can be implemented. Just kidding. 
23 Only private transfers are considered yet. Neither public households nor finance sectors have been considered  
yet. Capital income is gained due to a unique and exogenously fixed interest rate on property. This rate does not 
vary.  
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addition – public goods24, also associated to globally known prices. These goods cannot be consumed 
directly by the agents. They have rather to be transformed by the home production process to 
consumable “commodities”. 
 
Males, in addition, have a certain degree of finding a partner [0,1] that determines their speed, women 
have show certain propensity to take a partner. Within these two parameters the historical experience, 
the difference of individual fecundity and fertility, and the possibility to improve the current (economic) 
situation are reflected.  
5.2.2 The grid  
Currently, a cell on the simulation grid just can have two states. Either, a household has been build on it 
(cell is marked yellow), or not (default colour). No mate-searching male will try to get on a marked 
cell25. 
 
Although depicted as rectangle, the grid has – like in many ABS platforms – the geometric form of the 
surface of a torus. Hence, like described in beginning of chapter 3, an agent “leaving” the grid on the left 
will “return” on the right. No agent will drop out.  
5.2.3 Global values  
As described above, prices – and hence wages – are globally known and exogenous to the individual 
agents26. In addition  
• Time (measured in days and years; per day one transformation in state can be executed perr 
agent), 
• Demographic variables like 
o Pregnancies (percent on women in partnership), 
o Share of fertile partnerships (just age criterion; does not control for zero-fecundity), 
o Completed fertility (share of “realized” children in respect to initial fecundity27), 
o Unrealized fecundity (rest-fertility), 
o Age distribution by gender, and 
• Variables  needed for technical reasons 
are globals to the simulation procedure.   
                                                
24 For simplicity, these goods are associated with the cell the household is located on. In future versions, public 
goods can be associated to agents – at least temporarily. In case of a divorce, partners have to negotiate on the 
shares of public goods each adult agent gets. Up to now females stay with the public goods, but do not act 
strategically in this respect. Anyway, in case of divorce, males have to build up public again. As the property of 
public goods is not a criterion  for the attractivity parameter, this plays no mayor role.    
25 Perhaps later this assumption will be relaxed to improve to reality 
26 in fact it will be the most fruitful challenge to endogenize  the price vector. In this stage just one private and one 
public good exists. While agents can differ  in  their productivity regarding home production, they do not in respect 
of market labour. This reflects widely the state of the discussion within the theoretical papers, this simulation is 
grounded on. 
27 As – implemented in a recent module – fecundity varies with experience and social norms, the definition of this 
global has to be changed to [# children / (# children + present fecundity)], as  the agents  do  not remember their 
initial values of fecundity. Anyway, this information is more valuable  to the experimenter. 
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5.3 The core – variation in agents’ behaviour 
According to underlying game-theoretical models, following procedures are went though by every 
simulation loop. 
5.3.1 Partner matching 
As described in 5.2.1, currently unmated males search for females by wandering a random walk  over the 
grid. Once they have found a matchable female (according to age), partnership negotiation  begins: As 
every agent (males like females) is endowed with a certain degree of attractiveness28, both compare the 
attractiveness level of the potential spouse to their “attractiveness reservation level”. This reservation 
level is a function of  
• primarily, the own attractiveness; additionally 
• social status, indicated  by 
o human capital  level, and 
o wealth. 
 
When attractivity meets the demand bilaterally, a partnership is initiated. Theoretical models refer to the 
fact, that  prevailing differences in attracivity between the partners contribute to differences in bargaining  
positions, as outside options differ. In this simulation model, this contribution to strategic settings is  left 
disregarded, as the agents  have no information about outside options in general. Of course, in later 
versions this also can be implemented by defining respective globals.  
 
A special issue on agents who haven’t found a partner “for years” has been  added. Comparable to 
contact announcements in newspapers, a global “blackboard” has been implemented. Agents with 
respectively high propensity to  find/take a  partner  that haven’t  succeeded up to a certain “panic  age” 
that can  be set globally by the user – as the age a female/male “has to be mated” at refers rather to a 
social norm than to individual values29 - can put their “names” (agent IDs) on this global blackboard. 
Whenever a possibly matchable female (again, the male agent  just can identify the gender and  the  age 
of  the annotated female) can be identified on this blackboard, the male possibly crosses the  whole grid  
to  get to her30.  
 
Finally, as will be seen in the depictions of some simulations, enough matches can be made to hold 
population at least constant. But as many events are depending on well-defined probabilities, this can not 
been guaranteed31.  
                                                
28 Attractiveness in it’s general meaning. Far more than physical attractiveness. 
29 A valuable contribution on this issue has been  programmed and evaluated by Billari/Prskawetz/Fürnkranz (2003), 
represented as – reprogrammed – NetLogo application at the conference on “ABCD – Agent-Based Computational 
Demography”, organized by the Vienna Institute for Demography – Austrian Academy of Sciences (Vienna, January 
2004) 
30 up to now no costs are associated to searching and moving 
31 Up to the present stage, agents haven’t become “intelligent”, they can not adapt rules to meet changes in their 
environment.  So – negatively formulated – at this stage, it is still a question of time a populations dies out, either 
slowly because of insufficient fertility, or fast, due to an overcrowding of the grid. In this situation the male agents, 
who are searching for mates, can not continue to move. Single females stay unmated, grow old, no new  births 
occur. The elder stay in  their cells (homes) 40+ up to (possibly) age 99, “wasting” the space needed by the  
younger, still fertile agents. 
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5.3.2 Resource allocation 
As partners have matched, the daily struggles have begun. This simulation focuses on the distribution of 
leisure, private and public goods as well as on future chances. Agents’ preferences are described by a 
quasi-utility function, which represents the time allocation, public and private goods, and an expected 
value of human capital level32. With every loop (every simulated year) partners renegotiate their 
realizable levels of these items. Given the negotiation outcome falls short in case of one item in respect 
of its reservation level, the agent considers to leave the partner. Satisfaction with current  partnership 
(agent’s parameter) declines. As reservation levels change with outside options, the negotiation contends 
different arguments each year. 
5.3.3 Decision for/against offsprings 
Following Becker (1993, p 135ff), parents consider children like “long-term (intra-household-public) 
consumption goods” they gain additional utility from. These “goods” are associated with costs (time, 
wealth). Up to this stage of the project, female  agents in partnership33 give  birth to children  according 
to the minimum of fecundity of both partners. Expample: male’s fecundity (2.2) &  female’s  fecundity 
(3.1) Î the  female agent  will become pregnant – controlled by the hazard rate  of becoming  
pregnant within the recent month – and  give  birth to the child within the appropriate time span  (38 - 
40 weeks). When the partnership ends, female agents of course stay pregnant, but can not become 
pregnant unless a new partner is found. Given the partnership holds for longer period – and fecundity 
does not change too much - a second  pregnancy will come (as  both agents  have fecundity parameter  
> 2.0). After birth of the second  child negotiation on a third child occurs. Depending on the agents’ 
bargaining power and respective values  of “rest-fertility” (m: 0.2; f:1.1) the probability of having another  
child is calculated. Based on this probability, a Bernoulli-experiment on a third pregnancy is executed.  
Within this approach, unfulfilled fecundity is  not an argument  for  partnership stability34, so when once 
the decision  was set against a(nnother) pregnancy, this negotiation will not be  repeated within this 
partnership, but  it is  no argument for slitting up. Nevertheless, when new  partnerships are formed, the 
agent’s rest-fertilities are again  subject  for  negotiation. 
 
As agents negotiate over children  immediately after a partnership has begun and  renegotiate after a 
quite short interval after birth,  timing  and spacing of births is very  frequent. No life-course 
interdependency has been introduced yet. 
5.3.4 Partnership stability 
As mentioned above, partnership holds as long reservation levels are kept exceeded. So, the most likely 
case for  separation occurs, when agents have recently founded a partnership, they have accepted the 
other as reasonable (age) and sufficiently attractive  (regarding general attractiveness, wealth and human  
capital – items that can not be adjusted within  short  time  spans), and then start to negotiate over time 
investments, distribution of private goods, and levels of public goods. When reservation level for an item 
is not reached, this partnership splits up immediately35.  
 
                                                
32 In fact reservation levels of (uncompensated) demand  function are assigned to the agents   
33 single-motherhood is excluded from simulation  yet – that’s another issue for further modules 
34 this  is a great challenge to an utility-based negotiation procedure to  be developed  
35 as these steps all occur within one simulated day, this refers – in some sense – to a one night stand. Contrary to 
one  night  stands observed in reality,  agents ever honestly try to build up a long term partnership. 
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Given a partnership has lasted longer36, partners  do not split  up immediately when  reservation level of 
a single item hasn’t been exceeded. In this case, the parameter for “satisfaction in current  partnership” is  
reduced37. Having started a partnership  the  value is set to  [1]. After renegotiation  the value is 
replaced by 
 i
u
i i i
i i
s 1 x q x q= − ∑ ∑  (3), 
where i
ux denotes an occurrence of shortfall, ix the kind of item investigated, iq  the agent’s preference  
for this item . The probability of ending the partnership is simply set to 1 s− . The decision of one 
partner for splitting is sufficient. The partnership – possibly – ends within 365 days (time of splitting up is 
uniformly distributed).  
 
6 Simulation runs  
 
Before showing results, here some additional information on the  process  sequences. 
6.1 Setup procedure and starting population 
In this procedural first step agents are created. The experimenter can define the number  of male and 
female adults. In addition the experimenter sets the initial net reproduction rate (NRR) of this artificial 
population. With this information, the simulation platform creates the number of adults plus – according 
to the NRR – the number of children a female agent already has. The probability of having (multiple) 
children is determined by the fecundity  parameter  and the age of the female – as it is more likely for a 
female aged 35 to have  3 children, as it is for an agent aged 20.  
 
The experimenter can control for the age distribution of the artificial starting population by varying the 
maximum age. Following a uniform probability distribution for age38, the adults are aged [20 – maximum 
age]. As number of agents is comparably  low – at least for experiments that  should process 
comparably fast – the uniformity of age distribution can  hardly be  reconstructed. At the end of the 
setup procedure the age distribution is calculated and displayed (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: Age distribution of population  
All parameters of the adult agents are initialized within this setup procedure. In contrast, child agents 
haven’t initialized all values. They rather “inheritate” some parameters from their parents. So, the driving 
determinant of fecundity  of  an adolescent child is the number of (siblings + 1) plus a globally defined  
                                                
36 At minimum two days; but as bargaining over resource allocation happens once  a  year, renegotiation on the  
next  day is very unlikely 
 
38 to be exact, for a certain day of birth; as the starting day of the simulation is labelled “0”, the day of birth of 
members of the starting population has to be  negative 
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propensity. Therefore individual  values as social norms influence the starting value  of this individual 
parameter. 
6.2 The simulation 
After setup has been  completed39, the simulation is ready to start. With the GO command, males start  
to move and search for mates, matched partners negotiate  resource allocations and  fertility  decisions, 
some females  become pregnant, after  while new agents  are  born, divorces  occur, child agents 
become adults, and elder agents die.  
 
In this section some computational experiments will be shown. Although the behavioural model behind 
this simulation has been designed and grown in manifold dimensions, little emphasis has been placed on 
the output yet. This has several reasons: first, the average outcome of individual negotiations  should be 
depicted on individual basis, second, aggregated levels  of, say, satisfaction with current partnership, will  
not show its distribution. Further modules will provide distribution statistics of these parameters and 
controls on global social norms40. 
 
 
Figure 2: masFIRA simulation  run (standard  setting) 
 
The simulation depicted in Figure 2 shows typical results: The starting population contained 170 male 
and female adult agents  each plus a number of children (living at the mother agent’s cell. At startup, the 
                                                
39 can take several minutes  for larger populations! 
40  for instance a controller for splitting the partnership,  when satisfaction level is below one; (0;1]. With this 
controller the  probability of divorce can be decreased globally 
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agents were aged up to age 80, were situated in a mixed population setting41 . After 12 years and 42 
days (4426 simulation runs) about 60% of  adult agents are living in partnerships. The others are  actively 
searching (males) or passively waiting to be found by an attractive partner(females)42.  
 
The simulation grid (black area) depicts the simulation grid. Males (blue) are searching for female mates 
in every direction possible with individual speed. Females (red) in turn wait43 and see. Agents that have  
founded a partnership move together (both on one cell). This cell therefore turn yellow. Child agents 
(males: purple; females: orange) also live on that cell (share the household with their parents) 
 
Figure 3 shows results of other simulations, where first the probability for divorce had been set globally 
near zero (a). Some oscillation of aggregated values of realized partnerships occurred, but that was due 
to the fact  that some child agents became  adult, shifting the total number of adults up (at same  time 
no deaths occurred), so the  slope of the share of adults in partnerships sometimes became negative.  
 
   
Figure 3: Realized partnerships (a) no  divorces    (b) some divorces from sim-period 2000 – 5000 
 
The same parameter settings were used in the beginning of the second simulation in (b). Around  
simulated period 2000 (5 years 175 days) the experimenter raised probability of divorce by enabling the 
possibility that  parameter “satisfaction in current  partnership” becomes less that “1”, so divorces rose, 
the share of realized partnerships started to oscillate, even with a  negative trend. Around period 5000 
another change occurred:  The experimenter changed divorce behaviour by changing weights of selected 
reservation levels. Although is was still possible to divorce, as de-facto just one utility-gaining activity  
stayed relevant  for reducing the satisfaction  within current partnership (leisure) all agents that  would 
have  separated  due to inconveniences regarding other activities  or  goods now had no (valuable) 
reason for  separating. As agents have grown older, mostly  with the experience, that they could not 
agree on resource allocation with sufficiently attractive agents44, the  part  that has passed  “panic age” – 
the social norm  for being in a long-term  partnership – now  search more efficiently by  watching the 
global blackboard for contact announcements. For this reason the slope  of the share of adults in 
partnership rises more strongly than at periods near under 2000.  
 
                                                
41 for some simulations a gender-segregated setup can be selected  
42 of course this setting could be  designed in vice versa. The matching probability  decreases sharply when  both 
genders search actively. 
43 All females point their head  to in one direction, but sometimes an adolescent female moves from the mother’s 
place to a free cell, so  this particular agent points her head temporarily to another direction 
44 The “one night stands” 
  masFIRA 
 
 22
 
Figure 4: Fertile agents in partnerships and fertility. Simulated from setup procedure on. 
 
The information on the share of adult agents in partnerships in quite valuable, more interesting is the 
information on adult fertile agents in partnerships. The graph  depicted in Figure 4 shows this share (blue 
line) for a simulation  with no divorce. The oscillation is  due to the fact that agents join  this group  
(adolescents), others leave the group (females > age 40; this share depicts in fact just females). A certain 
percentage has decided to become pregnant, most are pregnant in fact (red line). As pregnancy occurs 
quite immediately after forming a partnership, pregnancies typically rise up sharply in early stages of the 
simulation, returning to adequate levels after about 2  years. For this reason often pre-simulated starting 
population are used, where population has been - at least partly – generated by the simulation process 
than by the setup procedure (Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5: Fertile agents in partnerships and fertility. Population  pre-simulated. 
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7 Summary and Outlook  
 
Within this documentation the fundamentals of bargaining models concerning  
 
• family formation,  
• fertility,  
• resource distribution,  
• and partnership dissolution  
 
were reflected. A short introduction on agent based modelling shed some light on this rather new 
technique for economic analysis. In a compact section the agent-based-simulation developing 
environment NetLogo was introduced. A description of the most important processes and optional 
modules within masFIRA followed. Finally some simulation outcomes were discussed. 
 
As masFIRA will be continually developed and updated, this documentation should rather be seen as 
status report on modules that were implemented  by  end of 2004. In 2005 further challenging modules  
will be developed. The implementation of a comprehensive bargaining model, where  all relevant 
decisions are negotiated within, and where cardinal utilities functions can replace the quasi-Marshallian 
demand  functions used now, is planned. Further, special alignment processes will be implemented. For 
instance – to describe the most simplest invention – the risk of dying will not continue to be arbitrary, 
but depend on observed hazard rates, implemented by life tables. 
 
The simulation platform masFIRA is expected to become a valuable demonstration tool for demo-
economic models, as well a valid quasi-empirical simulation tool that helps analyse relevant observations.  
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Appendix 
An example for ABS-simulation in NetLogo: “ALTRUISM” 
To see how NetLogo works, a simple model of human behaviour is presented here45.  
 
This model (Cooperation and Divide the Cake) are part of the EACH curriculum: "Evolution of Altruistic 
and Cooperative Habits: Learning About Complexity in Evolution". 
 
This is an evolutionary biology model. It models population genetics with respect to the fitness of traits 
that are affected by social and environmental conditions. The model has two types of patch agents: 
altruistic agents and selfish agents. 
 
The basic premise of the model is that the selfish agents and the altruistic agents are competing for each 
spot in the world by entering into a genetic lottery.  You can imagine these agents as plants who "seed" 
for a spot, and the dominant seed generally wins. The details of the lottery are explained below in 
HOW IT WORKS. 
 
Under normal (non-interfering) environmental conditions, the selfish agents win, and the altruistic 
population is driven to extinction. However, as outlined in 'CONTROLS ', when the environmental 
conditions are made more harsh, the altruistic population is able to survive, and even dominate the 
selfish population. 
 
How it works: 
1. Patches live in five-cell, plus-sign-shaped neighborhoods. Whenever a patch is calculating something 
about its fitness, it is the center of the neighborhood. For another patch, when that patch is calculating, it 
becomes merely one of the neighbors. 
 
2. Each patch is an agent that has a fitness. Each patch is also the location of a lottery for its space.  The 
patch and the four surrounding patches put in "seeds" to try to get the patch turned to their type of 
patch, altruist or selfish. Being successful in the lottery is getting patches to turn to your type.  We are 
assuming here that the type (altruistic or selfish) is the important genetic trait. 
 
3.  Each patch calculates its own fitness using equation: 
if it is A (altruist): 1 - cost + (Number Altruists in Neighborhood / 5 * benefit from Altruists) 
if it is S (selfish):  1 + (Number Altruists in Neighborhood / 5 * benefit from Altruists) 
 
Thus, the fitness of the S patch will be higher than the fitness of the A's.  If the cost is 0.2 and benefit is 
0.5, for an A surrounded by two S's and two A's, then the fitness of this spot is 1 - 0.2 + (3/5 * 0.5) = 
1.1. 
 
                                                
45 See http://ccl.northwestern.edu/cm/EACH/  for more information. Following text is taken from the program  
documentation 
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Figure 6: Simulation „ALTRUISM“. Setup values 
 
4.  After each patch has calculated its fitness, it looks to its four neighbors.  Each of the five patches, 
including itself, puts a weighted seed into a genetic lottery for this center spot.  So, for example, if the 
neighborhood is ASASA, each of the three A's register their fitness value, and each of the two S's put in 
their fitness.  The A's are added, and the S's are added.  Let us assume that the A's add up to 3.2 (this 
includes the A in the center spot), and the S's add up to 2.6.  These two numbers are the altruist weight 
and selfish weight respectively, in the lottery for the center spot.  Now, the larger number, whichever it 
is, is called the Major seed; it is divided by the sum of all the fitnesses.   
 
Thus, 3.2/(3.2 + 2.6) = .552   
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(1) (2)
 
Figure 7: Simulation „ALTRUISM”, run for about 450 periods46 
 
This number is the Altruism seed in the lottery. The minor seed is 2.6/(3.2 + 2.6) = .448. (Notice that 
the Altruism seed of the parent is 3/5 = .600, while the child's is .552.  Even though altruism is 
dominating, it is losing ground.) 
 
5.  There are a number of ways of doing the lottery itself. Currently, we choose a random number 
between 0 and 1.  Now, if the Number is below the Minor seed, the minor weight gets the spot, and if it 
is above the major seed, the major seed gets the spot. So, in the example, if the random number is 
anywhere from .449 to 1, then the Major seed gets it. If it is between 0 and .448, the minor seed gets it. 
 
 
 
                                                
46 . Two changes of parameters by the user: (1) increased “harshness” of living conditions (0 Î 0.73) ; (2) 
increased “benefits of altruism”  (0.48 Î 0.75) 
 
  masFIRA 
 
 28
Controls for the user: 
SETUP button -- sets up the model by creating the agents. 
GO button -- runs the model 
ALTRUISTIC-PROBABILITY slider -- lets you determine the initial proportion of altruists 
SELFISH-PROBABILITY slider -- determines the initial proportion of selfish agents. 
ALTRUISM-COST slider -- determines the value of cost in the above fitness equations. 
BENEFIT-FROM-ALTRUISM slider -- determines the value of benefit in the above fitness equations. 
 
There are two sliders for controlling environmental variables: 
HARSHNESS slider -- sets the value for the resistance of empty patch spots to being populated by 
agents.  The value for this slider determines a corresponding value in the lottery for each empty (black) 
spot on the grid; the higher this value, the more difficult it is to populate. 
DISEASE slider -- sets the value for the possibility that the agents in occupied spots will die.  The value 
for this slider is factored into the genetic lottery, and determines the percentage chance that each agent 
will die out from their spot. 
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The NetLogo Code of masFIRA (at 2004-12-27) 
 
globals [ 
  time 
  days 
  years 
  days-in-current-year 
  partnerships-pct 
  fertile-partnerships-pct 
  pregnancies-pct 
  any-break-condition-met? 
  completed-fertility 
  rest-fertility 
  realized-fertility 
  rest-fertility-avg  
  realized-fertility-avg 
  m-agelist 
  f-agelist 
  avg-female-desire-for-late-partnership 
  avg-male-desire-for-late-partnership 
  search-partner-blackboard 
]   
 
turtles-own [ 
  mother                                      ;; ID of mother 
  father                                      ;; father's ID 
  child                                       ;; all children ID 
  agent-in-start-population?                  ;; mark agents in start population 
  adult?          ;; adulthood not just depending on age, rather a 
functionof several factors (adults are prepared to search/accept a partner)   
  age                                         ;; age in years 
  agedays0                                    ;; age in days at setup (if agent in start 
population) 
  agedays                                     ;; age in days 
  day-of-birth                                ;; since simulation started (if agent in start 
population  => agedays0 * (-1)) 
  attractiveness                              ;; {(0,1)+delta} males are "less attractive" => 
have to compensate with social status variables 
  negotiation-power                           ;; (0,1) 
  satisfaction-in-current-partnership        ;; (0,1) - 0 at start 
  propensity-for-having-children              ;; (0,4.5) - setup range varies by sex; 
  day-found-recent-partner                    ;; no partner => day of birth - 1 
;  human-capital                               ;; (0,1) 
;  income                                      ;; (0,.) 
;    wage                                      ;; (0,1000) 
;    capital-income                            ;; (0,.) 
;    transfers                                 ;; (0,200) 
;  property                                    ;; (0,.) 
; activity-labour 
; activity-home-production 
; activity-child-care 
; activity-leisure 
; activity-education 
; commodity-public 
; commodity-private 
; price-of-commodity-public 
; price-of-commodity-private 
]   
 
breeds [male female]          ;; define types of agents 
 
male-own  [ 
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  propensity-to-search-for-partner            ;; (0,1) 
  found-attractive-woman? 
  partner                                     ;;  the turtle that is our partner, or "nobody" 
if we don't have one 
] 
 
female-own  [ 
  propensity-to-take-a-partner                ;; (0,1) 
  considered-by-man? 
  partner                                     ;;  the turtle that is our partner, or "nobody" 
if we don't have one 
  day-got-pregnant                            ;;  not pregnant => day of birth - 1 
  pregnant?                                   ;; 
] 
 
to setup  
  ca 
  set-starting-values 
  create-agents 
;  giving-birth-to-startpop-children 
  setup-plots 
end   
 
to go 
  break-conditions 
  if any-break-condition-met? [stop] 
  search-mates 
  intra-partnership-negotiations 
  time-dependent-events                              ;; all time-dependent-events 
end; go 
 
;;~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ begin SETUP procedures  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
to set-starting-values 
  set time 0 
  set days 0 
  set years 0 
  set any-break-condition-met? false  
;  ask patches [set pcolor green - 2] 
end; set-starting-values 
 
to create-agents                          ;; create types of agents 
  create-adult-agents 
  giving-birth-to-startpop-children 
  calc-age-distribution        
end ; create-agents  
 
to create-adult-agents 
  create-custom-male NMaleAdults [      ;; male adults 
    set color blue 
    set age 20 + random(StartPopAgeMax - 20) 
    set-startpop-adults-unisex-properties 
    set propensity-to-search-for-partner random-float (1) 
    set propensity-for-having-children (random-float(2) + random-float(1) + random-float(0.5)) 
    set found-attractive-woman? false    
  ]     
  create-custom-female NFemaleAdults  [   ;; female adults   
    set color red 
    set age 20 + random(StartPopAgeMax - 20) 
    set-startpop-adults-unisex-properties 
    set propensity-to-take-a-partner random-float(1) 
    set propensity-for-having-children (random-float(2) + random-float(1) + random-float(1) + 
random-float(0.5)) 
    set considered-by-man? false  
    set day-got-pregnant (day-of-birth - 1)  
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    set pregnant? false  
  ]   
  ask turtles [without-interruption[ 
    ifelse (breed = male) 
    [ ifelse (startpop-mixed?) 
      [ fd random (screen-edge-x * sqrt(2)) 
        if (count male-here > 1) 
        [ go-to-male-empty-cell ]] 
      [ fd random (screen-edge-x * 0.5) ] 
    ]   
    [ ifelse (startpop-mixed?) 
      [fd random (screen-edge-x * sqrt(2))]  
      [fd (screen-edge-x * 0.5) + random ((screen-edge-x * 0.5) * sqrt(2))] 
    ]   
  ]] 
  ask female with [adult?] [without-interruption[ 
    if (count female-here > 1) [ 
      go-to-female-empty-cell  
      fd random (screen-edge-x * sqrt(2)) 
    ] 
    set heading 0  
  ]]     
end; create-adult-agents 
 
to giving-birth-to-startpop-children 
  locals [number-of-startpop-children x1] 
  ask female with [adult? and age < 60] [without-interruption[ 
      ifelse (((age - 19) / 20 ) > 1) ; set weight parameter for completeness of fertility 
period 
        [ set x1  1 ] 
        [  
          set x1 ((age - 19) / 20 ) 
        ] 
      set number-of-startpop-children  floor (propensity-for-having-children * x1 * (0.8 + 
random-float 0.4) * NFR + 0.5) 
      hatch number-of-startpop-children [set mother myself]  
      ifelse (number-of-startpop-children < propensity-for-having-children) 
      [ set propensity-for-having-children (propensity-for-having-children - number-of-
startpop-children) ] 
      [ set propensity-for-having-children 0 ] 
  ]] 
  ask turtles with [mother != nobody][ 
    set adult? false 
    set heading 0 
    set age (age-of mother - 20 - random 21) 
    ifelse (random-float 2 < 1)  ;set sex per coin-throwing    ;  
    [ set breed female 
      set-startpop-female-children-properties ] 
    [ set breed male 
      set-startpop-male-children-properties ] 
  ] 
  ask turtles with [age >= 20 and not adult?] [die] 
  ask female with [adult?] [ 
    set child turtles-here with [mother = myself] 
  ] 
end; giving-birth-to-startpop-children 
 
to set-startpop-female-children-properties 
    set-startpop-children-unisex-properties 
    set color orange 
    set partner nobody         
    set propensity-to-take-a-partner 0 
    set considered-by-man? false 
    set day-got-pregnant (day-of-birth - 1) 
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    set pregnant? false 
end; set-startpop-female-children-properties 
 
to set-startpop-male-children-properties 
    set-startpop-children-unisex-properties 
    set color magenta 
    set propensity-to-search-for-partner 0 
    set found-attractive-woman? false 
end; set-startpop-male-children-properties 
 
to set-startpop-adults-unisex-properties 
;    set-all-new-agents-properties  
    set negotiation-power random-float(1) 
    set attractiveness random-float(1) 
    set agedays0 (age * 365.25 + random(365)) 
    set day-of-birth (agedays0 * (-1)) 
    set satisfaction-in-current-partnership 0 
    set agent-in-start-population? true 
    set adult? true   
    set mother nobody 
    set child nobody 
    set father nobody   
    set partner nobody  
    set day-found-recent-partner (day-of-birth - 1) 
end; set-startpop-adults-unisex-properties 
 
to set-startpop-children-unisex-properties 
    set-all-new-agents-properties 
    set agedays0 (age * 365.25 + random(365))    
    set day-of-birth (agedays0 * (-1)) 
    set agent-in-start-population? true 
end; set-startpop-children-unisex-properties 
 
to set-all-new-agents-properties 
    set day-of-birth days 
    set adult? false 
    set negotiation-power 0 
    set attractiveness 0 
    set propensity-for-having-children 0 
    set satisfaction-in-current-partnership 0 
    set agent-in-start-population? false 
    set partner nobody 
    set father nobody 
    set child nobody 
    set day-found-recent-partner (day-of-birth - 1) 
end; set all-new-agents-properties 
 
to set-new-female-agents-properties 
  set-all-new-agents-properties 
  set day-got-pregnant (day-of-birth - 1) 
  set pregnant? false 
  set age 0 
end; set-new-female-agents-properties 
to set-new-male-agents-properties 
  set-all-new-agents-properties 
  set age 0 
end; set-new-male-agents-properties 
;;~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  end SETUP procedures  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
;;~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ begin  GO   procedures  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
to break-conditions 
; progam stops when no male or female adults have suvived the last period 
  if ((count male = 0) or (count female = 0)) [ 
    show "population died out!" 
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    show "survivors:" 
    type "males    =>> "   show(count male) 
    type "females  =>> "   show(count female) 
    set any-break-condition-met? true 
  ] 
end; break-conditions 
 
to search-mates 
  man-searchs-for-woman   ;; male moves around searching for a partner around his age 
(accepted range of ages depending on female's attractiveness)  
  initial-bargaining      ;; female accepts or rejects to enter negotiation due to males's 
attractiveness 
end; search-mates 
 
to intra-partnership-negotiations 
 dynamic-bargaining      ;; (day by day) renegotiations due to changes in environment => 
resource (time) reallocations 
 crucial-events          ;; having children, entering/leaving labour force,  
end; intra-partnership-negotiations 
 
;; GO ----> begin: search-mates 
;; GO ------> begin: man-searchs-for-woman 
to man-searchs-for-woman                   ;; parts of code from "Partners Example" in NetLogo 
Code Examples 
  ask male with [partner = nobody and adult?] [without-interruption [ 
    do-dirmem-random-walk                 ;; random walk with some memory of direction agent 
had before 
    if (any? male-here with [self != myself and adult?]) 
      [ go-to-male-empty-cell ]  ;; do not share a cell with another male 
    if  ((any? female-here with [partner = nobody and adult?]) and  
         (age-of random-one-of female-here > age-of self * (1 - (attractiveness-of random-one-
of female-here) / 2)) and 
         (age-of random-one-of female-here < age-of self * (1 + (attractiveness-of random-one-
of female-here) / 3)) 
        )  ;; male accepts female that is down to half or up to 4/3 of his age depending on 
females attractiveness 
    [ 
      set partner random-one-of female-here with [partner = nobody and adult?] 
      set color blue + 2 
      set partner-of partner self 
      set color-of partner red + 2 
      set heading 180 
    ] 
  ]] 
end; man-searchs-for-woman 
 
to partner-search-via-public-blackboard 
  locals [desire-for-late-partnership i j ] 
  ;; females > slider(panic-age) & with probablity of (propensity-to-take-partner & 
propensity-for-having-children & age) writes her "name" on pulic partnership-blackboard 
  ;; males   > slider(panic-age) & with probablity of (propensity-to-search-for-partner & 
propensity-for-having-children & age) select women from list (beginning from heading => FIFO-
algorithm 
  ;; NAME: search-partner-blackboard 
  ask female with [age >= PanicAge and partner = nobody] [ 
    set desire-for-late-partnership ((age - PanicAge + 1) / (100 - PanicAge) * propensity-to-
take-a-partner * propensity-for-having-children) 
    if (desire-for-late-partnership >= avg-female-desire-for-late-partnership ) 
    [ set search-partner-blackboard lput who search-partner-blackboard ]  
  ]  
  ask male with [age >= PanicAge and partner = nobody] [ 
    set desire-for-late-partnership ((age - PanicAge + 1) / (100 - PanicAge) * propensity-to-
take-a-partner * propensity-for-having-children) 
    if (desire-for-late-partnership >= avg-male-desire-for-late-partnership)[ 
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      set i (first search-partner-blackboard) 
      setxy (xcor-of turtle i) (ycor-of turtle i) - 1 
      set heading 0  
      set search-partner-blackboard remove i search-partner-blackboard 
    ] 
  ] 
  update-partnership-blackboard 
   
end; partner-search-via-public-blackboard 
 
to update-partnership-blackboard 
  locals [female-d4lp male-d4lp] 
  ask turtles with [age >= PanicAge and partner = nobody][ 
    ifelse (breed = female) 
    [ set female-d4lp lput ((age - PanicAge + 1) / (100 - PanicAge) * propensity-to-take-a-
partner * propensity-for-having-children) female-d4lp] 
    [ set   male-d4lp lput ((age - PanicAge + 1) / (100 - PanicAge) * propensity-to-take-a-
partner * propensity-for-having-children) male-d4lp] 
  ] 
  ifelse (breed = female) 
  [ set avg-female-desire-for-late-partnership (sum female-d4lp / length female-d4lp) ] 
  [ set avg-male-desire-for-late-partnership (sum male-d4lp / length male-d4lp) ] 
 
end; update-partnership-blackboard 
 
;; GO ------> end: man-searchs-for-woman 
 
;; GO ----> begin: initial-bargaining 
to initial-bargaining    ;; woman accepts or rejects to enter partnership-negotiation due to 
man's attractiveness 
  ask female with [partner != nobody and adult?] [without-interruption [ 
    ifelse (attractiveness-of partner > attractiveness-of self * 0.7)[ 
        define-threat-points 
        form-household 
        set day-found-recent-partner days;; set date (day) partnership starts 
        set day-found-recent-partner-of partner day-found-recent-partner 
      ] 
      [; male has to leave female (with considerable distance) - cancel all partner infos 
      ask partner [without-interruption [         
        set partner nobody 
        set color blue - 2 
        fd (random 3) + 2 
        go-to-male-empty-cell 
      ]] 
      set partner-of partner nobody 
      set partner nobody 
      set color red - 2 
      ] 
  ]] 
end; initial-bargaining 
 
to define-threat-points 
  ;; initial bargaining results, time allocation 'guideline', threat points 
end; define-threat-points  
 
to form-household  ;; setup joint household 
  ask male with [partner != nobody] [without-interruption[ 
    if ((any? male-here != myself and adult?) or (any? female-here != partner-of myself and 
adult?)) [ 
      ask male-here with [self != myself and adult?] [without-interruption[ 
        while [any? male-here with [adult?]] [ 
          fd random 2 
          go-to-male-empty-cell 
        ] 
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      ]] 
      ask female-here with [adult? and self != partner-of myself] [without-interruption[ 
        while [any? female-here with [adult?]] [ 
          fd random 2 
          go-to-female-empty-cell        
        ] 
        set heading 0 
      ]] 
    ]  
  ]] 
  set pcolor yellow 
end; form-household   
;; GO ----> end: initial-bargaining 
;; GO --> end: search-mates 
 
;; GO --> begin: intra-partnership-negotiations 
to dynamic-bargaining 
;; redefine threat points 
end; dynamic-bargaining 
 
to crucial-events ; crucial events within partnership 
  ;; getting (an additional) child, 
  ask female with [adult? and age < 40 and propensity-for-having-children > 0.1 and partner != 
nobody ][ 
    negotiate-for-another-child 
    give-birth-to-another-child 
  ] 
  ;; entering/leaving labour force, 
  ;; education,  
end; crucial-events 
 
;; GO ----> begin - crucial-events-procedures 
to negotiate-for-another-child 
  ; arguments: propensity for having children - both partners; weight by negotiation-power & 
life phase & stability of partnership (history + satisfaction-in-current-partnership 
  if ( propensity-for-having-children-of partner > 0.1 and not pregnant?  
  and ((2 * (age - 19) / 20) * (propensity-for-having-children * negotiation-power + 
propensity-for-having-children-of partner * negotiation-power-of partner) / (negotiation-power 
+ negotiation-power-of partner)) > 1  
  ) 
;  [ if ((days - day-found-recent-partner) + random 200 > 300 ) 
    [ 
      set day-got-pregnant (days + random 400) 
      set pregnant? true 
;    ] 
  ]    
end; negotiate-for-another-child 
 
to give-birth-to-another-child 
  if (pregnant? and days > day-got-pregnant + (39 * 7)) [ 
    hatch 1 [ 
      set mother myself 
      set day-of-birth days 
    ] 
    ifelse (propensity-for-having-children > 1) 
    [ set propensity-for-having-children (propensity-for-having-children - 1) ] 
    [ set propensity-for-having-children 0 ] 
    ask turtles-here with [mother = myself and day-of-birth = days][ 
      set adult? false 
      set heading 0   
      ifelse (random-float 2 < 1)  ;set sex per coin-throwing 
      [ set breed female 
        set-new-female-agents-properties ] 
      [ set breed male 
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        set-new-male-agents-properties ] 
      if (any? male-here with [adult?])  
      [ set father random-one-of male-here with [adult?]] 
    ] 
    set day-got-pregnant (day-of-birth - 1)   
    set pregnant? false 
  ]    
end; give-birth-to-another-child 
;; GO ----> end - crucial-events-procedures 
;; GO --> end: intra-partnership-negotiations 
 
;; GO --> begin: time dependent events 
to time-dependent-events 
    set time time + 1 
    set days floor (time)                      ;; days are some linear function of time 
(depending on setup size, ram, os, etc.)  
    if (years < floor (days / 365.25)) [ 
      set years floor (days / 365.25) 
      calc-age-distribution   
      update-plot-age-distribution-women 
      update-plot-age-distribution-men  
      calc-completed-fertility 
      update-plot-completed-fertility      
    ]   
    set days-in-current-year floor (days - years * 365.25) 
    if (UpdateInterval <= 0) [  set UpdateInterval  1  ] 
    if ((days mod (UpdateInterval)) = 0)  
    [ 
      calc-partnerships-percent 
      calc-fertile-partnerships-percent 
      calc-pregnangcies-percent 
      update-plot-realized-partnerships 
      update-plot-fertile-partnerships 
      ask turtles with [age > 100] [ die ] 
      transition-to-adulthood 
  ;    partner-search-via-public-blackboard 
    ] 
    ask turtles [without-interruption[ 
      ifelse agent-in-start-population? 
        [set agedays (agedays0 + days)] 
        [set agedays (days - day-of-birth)] 
      if (age  < floor (agedays / 365.25)) 
        [ set age floor (agedays / 365.25) ] 
    ]]  
end; time-dependent-events 
;; GO --> end: time dependent events 
 
;;~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  end   GO   procedures  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
;;=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*begin  PLOT  procedures  =*=*=*=*=*=*=*=* 
to setup-plots 
  setup-plot-age-distribution-women 
  setup-plot-age-distribution-men 
  setup-plot-completed-fertility 
  setup-plot-realized-partnerships 
  setup-plot-fertile-partnerships 
  update-plot-age-distribution-women 
  update-plot-age-distribution-men 
  update-plot-realized-partnerships 
  update-plot-fertile-partnerships 
  calc-completed-fertility 
  update-plot-completed-fertility 
end; setup-plots   
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to setup-plot-age-distribution-women 
  set-current-plot "Age Distribution Women" 
  set-plot-y-range 0 2 
  set-plot-x-range 0 100 
end; setup-plot-age-distribution-women 
to setup-plot-age-distribution-men 
  set-current-plot "Age Distribution Men" 
  set-plot-y-range 0 2 
  set-plot-x-range 0 100 
end; setup-plot-age-distribution-Men 
to setup-plot-completed-fertility 
  set-current-plot "Completed Fertility" 
  set-plot-y-range 0 2 
  set-plot-x-range 25 40   
end; setup-plot-completed-fertility 
to setup-plot-realized-partnerships 
  set-current-plot "Realized Partnerships" 
  set-plot-y-range 0 100 
  set-plot-x-range 0 (UpdateInterval * .1 + 10) 
end; setup-plot-realized-partnerships 
to setup-plot-fertile-partnerships 
  set-current-plot "Fertility" 
  set-plot-y-range 0 100 
  set-plot-x-range 0 (UpdateInterval * .1 + 10) 
end; setup-plot-fertile-partnerships 
 
to update-plot-age-distribution-women 
  set-current-plot "Age Distribution Women" 
  histogram-from (female) [age] 
end; update-plot-age-distribution-women 
to update-plot-age-distribution-men 
  set-current-plot "Age Distribution Men" 
  histogram-from (male) [age] 
end; update-plot-age-distribution-men 
 
to update-plot-realized-partnerships 
  set-current-plot "Realized Partnerships" 
  plot partnerships-pct 
end; update-plot-realized-partnerships 
to update-plot-fertile-partnerships 
  set-current-plot "Fertility" 
  set-current-plot-pen "FertilePartnerships" 
  plot fertile-partnerships-pct 
  set-current-plot-pen "RecentPregnancies" 
  plot pregnancies-pct 
end; update-plot-fertile-partnerships 
 
to update-plot-completed-fertility 
  set-current-plot "Completed Fertility" 
  histogram-list completed-fertility 
end;;update-plot-completed-fertility 
;;=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*  end  PLOT  procedures  =*=*=*=*=*=*=*=* 
 
;;=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*begin BASIC procedures  =*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*= 
to calc-partnerships-percent 
  ifelse (count male with [adult?] > count female with [adult?]) 
  [ set partnerships-pct (100 * (count female with [partner != nobody and adult?]) / count 
female with [adult?]) ] 
  [ set partnerships-pct (100 * (count male with [partner != nobody and adult?]) / count male 
with [adult?]) ] 
end; calc-partnerships-percent 
 
to calc-fertile-partnerships-percent 
  ifelse (count male with [adult? and age < 60] > count female with [adult? and age < 40]) 
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  [ set fertile-partnerships-pct (100 * (count female with [partner != nobody and adult? and 
age < 40]) / count female with [adult? and age < 40]) ] 
  [ set fertile-partnerships-pct (100 * (count male with [partner != nobody and adult? and age 
< 60]) / count male with [adult? and age < 60]) ] 
end; calc-fertile-partnerships-percent 
 
to calc-pregnangcies-percent 
  ifelse (count female with [partner != nobody and adult? and age < 40] > 0) 
  [ set pregnancies-pct (100 * count female with [pregnant?] / count female with [partner != 
nobody and adult? and age < 40]) ] 
  [ set pregnancies-pct 0 ] 
end; calc-pregnangcies-percent 
 
to calc-completed-fertility 
  locals [rf40 rf35 rf30 rf25 c40 c35 c30 c25 cf40 cf35 cf30 cf25 rf40-avg rf35-avg rf30-avg 
rf25-avg c40-avg c35-avg c30-avg c25-avg cf40-avg] ;rest-fertility & number of  children at 
agerange (X to X+5) 
  ;; just females (as fertility period for males is quite fuzzy) 
  ifelse (count female with [age >= 40 and age < 45] > 1) 
  [ set rf40 sum values-from female with [age >= 40 and age < 45] [propensity-for-having-
children]  
    set c40 sum values-from female with [age >= 40 and age < 45] [child] 
    set rf40-avg (rf40 / count female with [age >= 40 and age < 45]) 
    set c40-avg (c40 / count female with [age >= 40 and age < 45]) 
    ifelse (c40 + rf40 > 0)  
    [ set cf40 100 * (1 - (rf40 / (c40 + rf40))) ] 
    [ set cf40 0 ] 
  ] 
  [ set cf40 0 ]  
  ifelse (count female with [age >= 35 and age < 40] > 1) 
  [ set rf35 sum values-from female with [age >= 35 and age < 40] [propensity-for-having-
children]  
    set c35 sum values-from female with [age >= 35 and age < 40] [child] 
    set rf35-avg (rf35 / count female with [age >= 35 and age < 40]) 
    set c35-avg (c35 / count female with [age >= 35 and age < 40]) 
    ifelse (c35 + rf35 > 0)  
    [ set cf35 100 * (1 - (rf35 / (c35 + rf35))) ] 
    [ set cf35 0 ] 
  ]   
  [ set cf35 0 ]    
  ifelse (count female with [age >= 30 and age < 35] > 1) 
  [ set rf30 sum values-from female with [age >= 30 and age < 35] [propensity-for-having-
children]  
    set c30 sum values-from female with [age >= 30 and age < 35] [child] 
    set rf30-avg (rf30 / count female with [age >= 30 and age < 55]) 
    set c30-avg (c30 / count female with [age >= 30 and age < 55]) 
    ifelse (c30 + rf30 > 0)  
    [ set cf30 100 * (1 - (rf30 / (c30 + rf30))) ] 
    [ set cf30 0 ] 
  ] 
  [ set cf30 0 ]  
  ifelse (count female with [age >= 25 and age < 30] > 1) 
  [ set rf25 sum values-from female with [age >= 25 and age < 30] [propensity-for-having-
children]  
    set c25 sum values-from female with [age >= 25 and age < 30] [child] 
    set rf25-avg (rf25 / count female with [age >= 25 and age < 30]) 
    set c25-avg (c25 / count female with [age >= 25 and age < 30]) 
    ifelse (c25 + rf25 > 0)  
    [ set cf25 100 * (1 - (rf25 / (c25 + rf25))) ] 
    [ set cf25 0 ] 
  ] 
  [ set cf25 0 ]       
  set  completed-fertility (list cf25 cf30 cf35 cf40) 
  set  rest-fertility (list rf25 rf30 rf35 rf40) 
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  set  realized-fertility (list c25 c30 c35 c40) 
  set  rest-fertility-avg (list rf25-avg rf30-avg rf35-avg rf40-avg) 
  set  realized-fertility-avg (list c25-avg c30-avg c35-avg c40-avg) 
end; calc-completed-fertility 
 
to do-dirmem-random-walk                ;; random walk with some memory of direction agent had 
before 
  rt (random 20 - random 20) 
  fd (propensity-to-search-for-partner) 
end;  
 
to transition-to-adulthood 
  ask turtles with [age > 19 and not adult?] [without-interruption[ 
    set negotiation-power random-float(1) 
    set attractiveness random-float(1) 
    set adult? true     
    ifelse (breed = male)  
    [  
      set color blue 
      set propensity-to-search-for-partner random-float (1) 
      set propensity-for-having-children (random-float(2) + random-float(1) + random-
float(0.5)) 
      set found-attractive-woman? false 
      go-to-male-empty-cell 
    ] 
    [ 
      set color red 
      set propensity-to-take-a-partner random-float(1) 
      set propensity-for-having-children (random-float(2) + random-float(1) + random-float(1) 
+ random-float(0.5)) 
      set considered-by-man? false 
      go-to-female-empty-cell 
    ] 
  ]]  
end; transition-to-adulthood 
 
to go-to-female-empty-cell 
  rt random-float 360 
  fd random-float 10 
  if any? other-female-here 
    [ go-to-female-empty-cell ]          ;; keep going until we find an unoccupied patch 
  setxy pxcor pycor  ;; move to center of patch 
end; go-to-female-empty-cell 
 
to go-to-male-empty-cell 
  rt random-float 360 
  fd random-float 10 
  if any? other-male-here 
    [ go-to-male-empty-cell ]          ;; keep going until we find an unoccupied patch 
  setxy pxcor pycor  ;; move to center of patch 
end; go-to-male-empty-cell 
 
;;=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*  end BASIC procedures  =*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*= 
 
;;=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*begin CONTAINER =*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*= 
to OLD_go-to-female-empy-cell   
  locals [female-empty-patches target no-female-empty-patch?] 
  set no-female-empty-patch? true 
  while [no-female-empty-patch?] [without-interruption [ 
    set female-empty-patches neighbors with [not any? female-here with [adult?]] 
    ifelse (any? female-empty-patches)  
    [ 
      set target random-one-of female-empty-patches 
      set heading towards target 
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      fd distance target 
      set no-female-empty-patch? false 
    ] 
    [ 
      set heading random 360 
      jump 3  
      if (not any? female-here with [adult?]) [set no-female-empty-patch? false] 
    ] 
  ]]      
end; OLD_go-to-female-empty-cell 
 
to OLD_go-to-male-empty-cell   
  locals [male-empty-patches target no-male-empty-patch?] 
  set no-male-empty-patch? true 
  while [no-male-empty-patch?] [without-interruption [ 
    set male-empty-patches neighbors with [not any? male-here with [adult?]] 
    ifelse (any? male-empty-patches)  
    [ 
      set target random-one-of male-empty-patches 
      set heading towards target 
      fd distance target 
      set no-male-empty-patch? false 
    ] 
    [ 
      set heading random 360 
      jump 3  
      if (not any? male-here with [adult?]) [set no-male-empty-patch? false] 
    ] 
  ]]       
end; OLD-go-to-male-empty-cell 
 
to calc-age-distribution 
;this procedure sums up the number of agents within specific age ranges  =>  2 vectors of age 
cohorts per sex  
  locals [ i ] 
  set i 0 
  set m-agelist (list) 
  set f-agelist (list) 
  while [i < 100] [ 
   set m-agelist lput (count male with [age = i]) m-agelist 
   set f-agelist lput (count female with [age = i]) f-agelist 
   set i (i + 1) 
  ] 
end; calc-age-distribution 
;;=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*  end CONTAINER  =*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*= 
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